We uncover a positive relationship between the …rm's corporate governance quality, as measured by the degree of managerial entrenchment, and the quality of its real investment decisions. Firms whose managers are less entrenched invest more, invest more in line with their investment opportunities and have higher productivity of capital and labor. Rather than reducing overinvestment, our evidence suggests that good governance primarily mitigates underinvestment. These results are robust to alternative measures of investment opportunities and are not driven by product market competition or potential endogeneity between governance quality and investment opportunities.
Introduction
The only determinant of a …rm's optimal investment decision in a frictionless environment is its investment opportunities as measured by Tobin's marginal q (Tobin, 1969) .
However, several studies …nd that …rms'investment is sensitive to measures of internal funds, and in particular cash ‡ows. Analyzing a broad sample of US manufacturing …rms in the period 1990-2004, we …nd that in addition to …nancial constraints, managerial entrenchment is a statistically signi…cant and economically important determinant of investment. First, …rms with less entrenched managers as measured by the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index invest more than poorly governed …rms. Second, these investments are more in line with the growth opportunities when …rms are well governed. Third, …rms with less entrenched management have higher capital and labor productivity than poorly governed …rms.
The …nding that …rms with less entrenched managers invest more and also more e¢ ciently suggests that managers of such …rms are less inclined to seek the 'quiet life'. Therefore, they are less likely to underinvest. This result is consistent with the …ndings of Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan (2009) that higher quality of …rms'management is associated with higher investment levels. This result is also consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) who …nd that when managers are insulated from takeovers, worker wages rise, the destruction of old plants falls, and the creation of new plants slows down. Similarly, Atanassov (2007) …nds a negative association between anti-takeover laws and …rms'innovation activity. We present additional evidence that supports this 'quiet life'conjecture. For instance, well governed …rms have higher capital and labor productivity as measured by the sales to capital ratio and the labor to capital ratio. Therefore, the high level of investment they undertake does not seem to be consistent with overinvestment, since this would reduce productivity.
A possible explanation for the …nding that …rms whose managers are less entrenched invest less is that their true …nancial constraints are not properly captured by our …-nancial constraint proxies, which are cash ‡ow and the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) measure. For example, weaker governance could reduce transparency and deter external capital suppliers, thereby causing …rms to underinvest relative to the …rst best level (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). In fact, Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan (2009) show that …rms with more asymmetric information have higher leverage. We do …nd that …rms with more entrenched managers have signi…cantly higher leverage than …rms with less entrenched managers. This suggests that when managers are more entrenched, …rms are more …nancially constrained. However, poor governance that causes a …rm to be …nancially constrained cannot fully explain the observed relationship between governance and investment. If the only impact of managerial entrenchment is to tighten …nancial constraints, capital productivity and labor productivity could even increase with entrenchment. This is clearly not the case in our sample. Consequently, managerial entrenchment has a separate, detrimental impact on real investment quality.
Governance provisions that weaken shareholder rights and protect managers worsen the internal resource allocation within …rms.
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we address the agency con ‡ict between owners and managers by asking how the …rm's corporate governance mechanisms in ‡uence its real investment decisions. This is accomplished in three steps.
The …rst is to analyze the relationship between the level of the …rm's real investments and the degree of its managers entrenchment as measured by the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick index. Thus, we examine whether managerial entrenchment drives investment levels. Subsequently, we analyze how managerial entrenchment in ‡uences the responsiveness of the …rm's investment decision to its investment opportunities. Note that throughout the paper we intermittently refer to …rms whose managers are entrenched as poorly governed …rms and to …rms with unentrenched managers as well governed …rms. That is, we examine how corporate governance mechanisms relate to the capital budgeting process that allocates funds within the …rm. As Stein (2003) notes, this question of …rm-internal investment e¢ ciency has been studied to a lesser extent than the e¢ ciency of capital allocation across …rms. Our approach is novel in the real investment literature, where the link to corporate governance has been missing.
The third step is to show how governance quality in ‡uences not just the …rm's responsiveness to investment opportunities, but the ability to respond in the appropriate way. Several possibilities exist, which relate to whether managers invest too much (overinvest) or too little (underinvest) relative the q theory. As noted by Jensen (1986), overinvestment may occur when self-serving managers build unpro…table empires at the owner's expense. 1 Underinvestment may happen for a number of reasons. First, when incentive problems create …nancial constraints by driving a wedge between the costs of internal and external capital (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). Second, when manager's preference for a quiet life makes them reject new investment projects with positive net present value (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) , Atanassov (2007) ). Third, when management has private information about their skills (Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986)). Fourth, when managers are short-termist (Narayanan (1985) , Stein (1989) ).
Finally, risk averse managers may overinvest or underinvest in ine¢ cient, diversi…ed conglomerates with low risk rather than in e¢ cient, specialized stand-alone projects (Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) ). We try to determine whether better governance typically reduces the costs of overinvestment or underinvestment.
Our second contribution to the literature is to rationalize the …nding that a …rm's governance mechanisms relate systematically to its economic performance (Shleifer and Vishny ( While this result is now incontrovertible, the channel through which this happens re-1 Roll (1986) and Heaton (2002) show that overinvestment may also be driven by managerial hubris.
mains underexplored. That is, the governance literature has not yet fully identi…ed why well-governed …rms produce superior performance. Since real investment determines the …rm's ability to produce output, real investment is a key intermediate variable between governance and performance. However, the observed positive association between governance quality and performance does not imply that better governance improves the allocation of resources. This will only be true if higher governance quality improves the way …rms respond to investment opportunities. It could be that managers of well governed …rms are not better than others at allocating real assets, but only at creating barriers to entry for competitors or at negotiating with labor unions. Thus, to understand whether governance drives the …rm's market value by way of e¢ ciency or by rent extraction, the key is not the link between governance and market value. Rather, it is whether the governance mechanisms relate systematically to the way management allocates the …rm's resources. The answer to this question has policy implications as well, as it addresses the social bene…ts of governance enhancing regulations. We try to shed light on this question by linking governance quality as re ‡ected by the degree of managerial entrenchment to investment quality. While …rms choose between several governance mechanisms, such as board monitoring, market for corporate control, executive compensation and more, our focus in this paper is on managerial entrenchment, which is a central corporate governance mechanism.
Our result that better governance, as measured by less managerial entrenchment, increases the investment quality are not due to endogeneity of the governance mechanisms. 2 Neither are they driven by product market structure. This is a potential explanation in the model of Grenadier (2002) , where product market competition erodes the option value of waiting to invest. Thus, …rms in competitive industries should exhibit 2 The assumption that governance is exogenous in the model is a potential problem we share with most governance studies (Becht et al, 2002) . One way endogeneity may materialize in our setting is if …rms with attractive investment opportunities improve their governance in order to raise external funding at better terms. We …nd no evidence of such a relationship. a higher sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities than …rms in less competitive (i.e., more concentrated) industries. Akdogu and MacKay (2007) study this issue empirically. Using Tobin's q as a proxy for growth opportunities and a Her…nd-ahl index to measure industry concentration, they examine whether industry structure a¤ects investment in a large sample of U.S. manufacturing …rms. Consistent with a wait-lose trade-o¤, they …nd that investment by …rms in high-concentration industries is about half as sensitive to changes in Tobin's q as in low-concentration industries. They also conduct a duration analysis and …nd that for large investments (both for …xed and …rm-speci…c investment cuto¤ levels), …rms in competitive industries invest sooner than …rms in monopolistic industries. In view of this …nding, we examine whether …rms with high governance quality, as re ‡ected by a low degree of managerial entrenchment, are also more likely to operate in competitive industries. We …nd that this is not the case.
Thus, our results are not driven by di¤erences in product market structure.
Overall, our …ndings constitute novel evidence on why there is a positive relationship between a …rm's corporate governance quality and its economic performance. It seems that well-governed …rms allocate their resources more e¢ ciently. This leads to higher capital and labor productivity relative to poorly governed …rms. Even though the low level of investment by poorly governed …rms may occur because they are more …nancially constrained, they do not invest e¢ ciently. The investments that they undertake lead to a reduction in capital and labor productivity and to lower sales growth compared with well governed …rms.
Our paper is related to the literature on how cross-country di¤erences in investor protection in ‡uence investment behavior. Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004) …nd that countries with a common law regime earn returns on investment that are at least as high as the cost of capital, whereas returns are below the cost of capital in civil law countries.
Similarly, Wurgler (2000) concludes that investment in declining industries is more e¤ectively curbed in countries with strong minority investor protection, which is more prevalent in common law than civil law regimes. Several international studies …nd that strong shareholder rights are positively associated with capital market development, valuation multiples, and economic growth (see, for example, Levine (1993a, 1993b ), La Porta et al (1997, 1998) , Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Allen and Gale (1997), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirgic-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)).
Our approach di¤ers from these studies in two ways. First, we keep the legal environment constant and study how managerial entrenchment di¤erences across …rms a¤ect individual …rms'investment rather than studying the e¤ects on aggregate investment of cross-country variations in governance quality. Second, we examine not just whether managerial entrenchment in ‡uences investment levels. We also analyze how managerial entrenchment in ‡uences responsiveness to investment opportunities and whether it works through mitigating overinvestment, underinvestment, or both.
A related paper to ours is by Hartzell, Sun and Titman (2006) , who use a sample of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to investigate how governance mechanisms interact with investments. However, REITs are required to pay almost all their earnings as dividends in order to be exempted from corporate taxes. This restriction practically eliminates the free cash ‡ow problem (Jensen, 1986 ) and hence management's ability to …nance value-destroying investments with internal funds. Thus, one would expect less severe agency con ‡icts within REITs than in most other …rms. In contrast, we focus on a broad sample of US manufacturing …rms with large cross-sectional variation in free cash ‡ow.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the variable construction. Section 3 contains the empirical tests. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
Data sources and variable construction
We match the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) The IRRC describes the corporate governance quality of a …rm based on 24 di¤erent provisions in the law and the corporate charter from 1990 to the present. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick split these characteristics into …ve major groups, which they call tactics to delay hostile bidders, voting rights, director protection, other takeover defences, and state laws, respectively. They use these characteristics to construct a governance index score per …rm by adding one point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights and hence increases the managers'power.
The sample period starts in 1990, ends in 2004, and includes all US manufacturing …rms for which there is ranking by the GQ index and for which Compustat has the data on items that we specify below. We focus on manufacturing …rms, since they are capital intensive, implying that their economic performance depends crucially on the quality of their real investments.
The basic dependent variable is the ratio of investment to capital, i k ; where i and k are Compustat items 128 (capital expenditures) and 8 (net property, plant and equipment), respectively. We use two proxies for investment opportunities. The …rst is Tobin's q, which we operationalize as the ratio of the market value of assets to their book value. The market value of assets is de…ned as its book value (item 6) plus the market value of common equity (the product of items 199 and 25) less the sum of the book value of common stock (item 60) and deferred taxes (item 74). The second measure of investment opportunities is sales growth, which we compute from Compustat item 12.
As a measure for the marginal product of capital and of capital productivity, we use the output to capital ratio ( y k ), where output is sales and capital is Compustat item 8.
3 Low y k
implies the …rm has excess capital capacity and low capital productivity.
We measure labor productivity as the output to labor ratio ( approach of …rst ranking by dividend payout and then using cash ‡ow as an investment determinant, the KZ index captures a wider set of characteristics that can re ‡ect how …nancially constrained a …rm is. The KZ measure classi…es a …rm as more …nancially constrained the higher the leverage, the lower the cash ‡ow, and the lower the dividend payout.
Empirical …ndings
We start by discussing descriptive statistics for our sample …rms in section 3.1, subsequently analyzing how the …rm's managers'entrenchment relates to the level of investment in section 3.2 and to its e¢ ciency in section 3.3. In the latter section, we also link managerial entrenchment to the question of overinvestment and underinvestment.
The robustness tests in section 3.4 analyze the sensitivity of our …ndings to alternative measures of investment opportunities, and to potential endogeneity between managerial entrenchment and investment opportunities. Finally, we examine whether a negative association between managerial entrenchment and product market competition drives our result that well governed …rms (i.e. …rms with less entrenched management) respond more precisely to investment opportunities.
Our statistical tests apply OLS regressions using …xed e¤ects panel data techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the …rm level. Speci…cally, from each observation of every regression variable x for …rm i at time t; we subtract the time series average of x for i: The OLS technique applied to such demeaned data provides unbiased and e¢ cient estimates (Hsiao (2003) ).
Descriptive statistics
The GQ index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) ranges from 0 (highest governance quality) to 20 (lowest governance quality). We follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, de…ning a democracy group as …rm years with a GQ of 5 or lower, whereas a dictatorship group has …rm years with a GQ of 14 or higher. Thus, if a …rm's GQ index varies over time, the …rm can potentially move over time from one group of GQ to another.
In addition, like Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, we de…ne a non-dictator group, which contains all …rm years outside the dictator group, that is, those with GQ below 14.
We avoid extreme outliers by disregarding …rm years in the population of US manufacturing …rms over 1990-2004 with investment to capital ratios above one. Only …rms with at least three years of data are included, and we ignore observations in the 1%
and 99% tails in our proxies for investment, investment opportunities, cash ‡ow, and the KZ measure of …nancial constraints. We also exclude …rm years in which …rms disinvest more than their capital stock. ; are higher for well governed …rms than for …rms with low governance quality. Thus, well governed …rms invest more, and the investment also varies more from …rm to …rm. Similarly, these …rms also have better ivestment opportunities as measured by our proxy for Tobin's q.
Cash ‡ow, cf , is fairly similar across the groups, whereas …rms with poor governance are on average more …nancially constrained according to the KZ index, where a more negative value re ‡ects a softer constraint. Thus, the availability of internal …nancing sources is rather independent of managerial entrenchment, but …rms with less entrenched management have better access to outside …nancing than …rms whose managers are more entrenched. This suggests the possibility that establishing good governance mechanisms may improve the …rm's access to outside …nancing sources.
These summary statistics show that, compared to …rms with low governance quality, the average …rm with good governance has better investment opportunities and invests more. To understand investment behavior better, however, we need to analyze how investment relates to investment opportunities in a way that more formally conditions this link on governance quality. For instance, the …nding that the volatility of the investment level is highest for well governed …rms may suggest they are more, rather than less, liquidity constrained, as unconstrained …rms should have a smooth investment patterns. On the other hand, the fact that their mean investment level is also higher suggests the opposite. Thus, capturing how managerial entrenchment, …nancial constraints, investment opportunities, and real investments interact requires a more comprehensive analysis.
Investment level
We start with a simple univariate model which regresses the level of investment on lagged governance quality:
The results of an OLS estimation of equation (1) appear under model (a) in Table 2 .
The estimated coe¢ cient for the GQ index is negative and highly statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. This result suggests that managerial entrenchment might be an important determinant of investment levels, as …rms with less entrenched managers invest more (recall that the GQ index is positively related to managerial entrenchment).
We There is a positive and highly statistically signi…cant relationship between investments and q, suggesting that investment increases with governance quality. Consistent with the extant literature, we …nd a positive relationship between investment and cash ‡ow and a negative relationship between investment and the KZ index. This suggests …rms invest less as they become more …nancially constrained. Taken together, the evidence from models (a)-(d) is consistent with both over-and underinvestment caused by agency problems, and with underinvestment due to …nancial constraints.
Next, we run a multivariate regression which includes all four variables from the univariate models:
The results, which are reported under model (e) in table 2, support the …ndings from the univariate regressions. Firms with higher governance quality invest signi…cantly more than …rms with lower governance quality, as the estimated coe¢ cient for GQ is -0.004 with a t-statistic of -2.98. The economic e¤ect is considerable, as a two standard deviations fall in the GQ index entails a 2.25 percentage points increase in the investment to capital ratio. The estimated coe¢ cient on investment opportunities is positive and highly statistically signi…cant. This e¤ect is also economically important, as an increase in q by two standard deviations increases the investment to capital ratio by almost six percentage points. Finally, the estimated coe¢ cients for cf and KZ both have the expected sign and are statistically signi…cant. 4 These results show that holding investment opportunities and …nancial constraints constant, …rms with good governance quality invest more than …rms with lower governance quality. Provided cf and KZ fully capture the extent to which a …rm is …nancially constrained, this …nding suggests that good governance directly reduces the underinvestment problem caused by entrenched managers seeking the 'quiet life'. Alternatively, if the two proxies only partially capture …nancial constraints, higher governance quality might just alleviate …nancial constraints, thereby enabling …rms to invest more. Either way, our results are consistent with the conjecture that poor governance, as re ‡ected by entrenched managers, leads to lower investment.
An alternative interpretation for the …nding that well governed …rms invest more is that they overinvest, and more so than other …rms. However, this is inconsistent with our earlier …nding in Table 1 that well governed …rms have higher Tobin's q. Moreover, as shown in Table 4 below, GQ is a signi…cant explanatory variable of …rms'capital and labor productivity. Speci…cally, …rms whose managers are less entrenched have higher capital and labor productivity, suggesting they they do not overinvest. Table 2 shows that investment levels decline with managerial entrenchment. The next question is whether entrenchment also matters for how accurately …rms respond to investment opportunities. i.e., for the e¢ ciency of investment. The models in this section separately regress investment on investment opportunities for …rms with di¤er-ent degrees of managerial entrenchment. This approach allows us to explore whether investment becomes more tightly linked to investment opportunities when governance quality improves. If this is the case, the regression coe¢ cient on investment opportunities will be larger the better the …rm's governance. Our approach to measuring investment e¢ ciency through the sensitivity of investment to q is similar to that of
Investment e¢ ciency

Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2002) and Akdogu and MacKay (2008).
For each of the three groups of …rms sorted by the degree of managerial entrenchment, we estimate the following investment equation using OLS: Table 3 reports the results. The …rst thing to notice is that …rms in the democracy group respond much more strongly to their investment opportunities than …rms in the dictatorship group. The sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities, as measured by q; is twice as large in well governed …rms as in poorly governed …rms, and it is highly statistically signi…cant. In contrast, the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi…cant for the dictatorship …rms. Thus, the di¤erence between the sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities of well governed …rms (as re ‡ected by the fact that their managers are not entrenched) and of poorly governed …rms is statistically signi…cant. This is an important new …nding showing that better corporate governance does improve the quality of real investment decisions.
Irrespective of managerial entrenchment, cf has the expected positive coe¢ cient and is statistically signi…cant. Similarly, the coe¢ cient on KZ has the expected negative sign across all three managerial entrenchment groups, indicating that stronger …nancial constraints decrease investment. However, the KZ e¤ect for …rms in the dictatorship group is statistically and economically strong and much larger than for …rms in the democracy group. This evidence supports the notion that unlike in well governed …rms, …nancial constraints reduce investment volume when the …rm is poorly governed.
In order to better understand whether managerial entrenchment in ‡uences underinvestment or overinvestment, we analyze the relationship between entrenchment and productivity. From the analysis so far, it seems that managerial entrenchment entails underinvestment, since …rms whose managers are entrenched invest less than …rms with less entrenched managers. However, it is not clear whether managerial entrenchment just constrains a …rm …nancially from making investments in general or if it allows for more investment decisions with low quality. One way to distinguish between these two explanations is by noticing that if entrenchment only in ‡uences …nancial constraints, leverage would be higher in poorly governed …rms. 5 In addition, poorly and well governed …rms should not di¤er in terms of labor and capital productivity.
In fact, it is likely that the underinvestment caused by …nance constraints cause …rms with entrenched management to have a higher marginal product of capital (labor) and hence higher capital (labor) productivity. In contrast, if managerial entrenchment has a role over and above that of causing …rms to be …nancially constrained, poor and well governed …rms would also di¤er in terms of productivity. Speci…cally, if entrenched managers seek the quiet life and do not exert e¤ort in searching for high productivity investment projects (highly skilled workers) then …rms whose managers are less entrenched would exhibit lower capital and labor productivity.
We already have some indication from Table 3 that good governance, as re ‡ected by lower managerial entrenchment, has a role beyond making a …rm less …nancially constrained. In particular, we found that well governed …rms invest more in line with investment opportunities. Table 4 takes this a step further by regressing leverage, capital productivity, and labor productivity on the …rst lag of GQ. The …rst regression helps to further understand the link between governance quality and …nancial constraints.
The two other regressions link governance quality to productivity. We would expect that if poor governance is only related to making a …rm more …nancially constrained, governance quality should be related to leverage but not to productivity.
There is a positive and marginally signi…cant relationship between leverage and Since outside regulators can impose or at least encourage a given governance quality, this result has policy implications. Governance-enhancing regulatory measures would lead to better resource allocation and hence to higher national wealth.
Robustness
We …rst consider the sensitivity of our …ndings to measuring investment opportunities not by Tobin's q, but by sales growth. Then, we explore the potential endogeneity between corporate governance quality and investment opportunities. Finally, we examine whether our results are driven by product market competition. The results are consistent with the …ndings under the base-case measure from Table 3 .
Investment opportunities
Investment is much more sensitive to sales growth in the democracy than in the dictatorship group. Consistent with the results in Table 3 , we also …nd that the coe¢ cient on investment opportunities for the dictatorship …rms is not statistically signi…cant.
Thus, regardless of how we measure investment opportunities, well governed …rms are responsive to investment opportunities while poorly governed …rms do not respond at all. The other estimates are also in line with those in Table 3 .
Endogeneity
We have so far assumed that a …rm's corporate governance quality is exogenous, both relative to the dependent variable (investment) and the other independent variables (investment opportunities and …nancial constraints). 6 The most pressing endogeneity question in our setting is probably not whether the investment determinants are partially driven by investment itself (i.e., reverse causation). Rather, it is whether investment opportunities and governance quality are systematically related. This dependence could arise if …rms with attractive investment opportunities improve their governance in order to raise external funding at better terms.
We want to assess whether we are safe to assume that the governance quality index is exogenous to our two alternative measures of investment opportunities (Tobin's q and y). In particular, we want to rule out the possibility that the governance mechanisms 6 Most empirical papers in corporate governance implicitly assume that causation runs from exogenous governance mechanisms to an endogenous performance measure. A typical framework of analysis is to regress Tobin's q on a subset of governance mechanisms and some control variables in singleequation models, such as in McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) . As argued by for instance Demsetz (1983) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , however, both governance and performance are endogenous if the governance mechanisms respond to the …rm's performance and vice versa. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) …nd that whereas several of their governance mechanisms are signi…cantly related to performance in single-equation models, most of these relationship become insigni…cant under simultaneous equation estimation. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) note that causality cannot be inferred from their …ndings.
as captured by the GQ index respond systematically to changes in our measures of investment opportunities. To this end we regress the changes in the governance index on lagged measures of investment opportunities. As this relationship may depend on …rm size, we test for potential interactions separately in small …rms (…rms in the bottom 33% according to book value of assets and capital stock) and in large …rms (…rms in the top 66%).
7 Table 6 shows that there is never a statistically signi…cant relationship between changes in the governance index and measures of past investment opportunities, regardless of how we measure the latter. Therefore, we appear to be safe in assuming that relative to each other, governance quality and investment opportunities are exogenous variables in our sample.
Product market competition
Akdogu and MacKay (2008) …nd that investment of …rms in competitive industries are substantially more responsive to investment opportunities than the investment of …rms in less competitive environments. They interpret their …nding as consistent with the real options model of Grenadier (2002) , which shows that competition erodes the real option value of waiting to invest. Intuitively, the value of waiting is dissipated if other …rms can divert the investment opportunity to themselves. This threat and hence the cost of waiting is higher the stronger the competition. Based on this idea, we need to ensure that our main result is not driven by product market competition. That is, we need to rule out that the higher responsiveness to investment opportunities in well governed …rms is not driven by a strong correlation between the GQ index and industry concentration. If well governed …rms are mostly found in competitive industries, then the higher quality of their investment decisions would not be due to their governance quality per se, but to a high cost of waiting to invest.
To examine this possibility, we follow Akdogu and MacKay (2008) We split industries into three groups based on the HI. Table 7 shows that the average GQ index is very similar across the three groups. Thus, there is no systematic association between corporate governance quality and industry concentration. We conclude that our …nding that well governed …rms exhibit greater investment e¢ ciency is not driven by product market competition.
Conclusions
The real investment literature has so far paid much more attention to the role of asymmetric information and the consequent constraint on external …nancing than to con ‡icts of interest between owners and managers and the resulting role played by corporate governance. Using a broad sample of US manufacturing …rms from 1990 to 2004, this paper analyzes empirically how the level and e¢ ciency of real investments depend on the quality of the …rm's management entrenchment as measured by the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) (the GQ index). We …nd that controlling for investment opportunities as measured by Tobin's q, …rms whose managers are less entrenched invest more than …rms with entrenched managers. Thus, corporate governance matters for real investment. This result is consistent with …rm-level corporate governance rules mitigating agency con ‡icts stemming from managers' tendency to seek the quiet life (as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Atanassov (2007) …nd) or alleviating …nancial constraints.
We also explore whether managerial entrenchment, as measured by the GQ index, worsens investment e¢ ciency. The …ndings are consistent with the notion that higher corporate governance quality leads to more e¢ cient investment, as …rms whose managers are less entrenched are more responsive to Tobin's q. While one e¤ect of managerial entrenchment is to create …nancial constraints which induce lower investment levels, we also …nd that badly governed …rms invest less in line with their investment opportunities, and that these investments lead to lower capital and labor productivity. These results are not driven by endogeneity between investment opportunities and corporate governance quality or by a correlation between corporate governance quality and product market competition.
Overall, our evidence suggests that the positive relationship between governance quality and economic performance found in the extant corporate governance literature can be partially explained by a higher quality of real investments in …rms with less entrenched managers. The existing empirical models of real investment behavior will bene…t from adding managerial entrenchment as an determinant beyond investment opportunities and …nancial constraints. is the investment to capital ratio, q is Tobin's q, cf is the cash ‡ow, KZ is the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) measure of …nancial constraints, and N is the average number of observations across the variables. Firms in the democracy (dictatorship) group have a GQ index score of 5 or less (14 or more), whereas non-dictatorship …rms have a score below 14. The GQ index is a proxy for the …rm's corporate governance quality developed and estimated by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick ( ) on lagged sales growth ( y), cash ‡ow (cf ), and the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) measure for …nancial constraints (KZ). R 2 is the adjusted R 2 , N is the number of observations, and t-ratios are in parentheses. Firms in the democracy (dictatorship) group have a GQ index score of 5 or less (14 or more), whereas non-dictatorship …rms have a GQ score below 14. The GQ index is a proxy for the …rm's corporate governance quality developed and estimated by Gompers This table shows the results of regressing the change in the …rm's corporate governance index from year t-1 to year t on its investment opportunities in year t -1. The alternative measures of investment opportunities are q (Tobin's q operationalized as market value over book value of assets) and the growth rate of sales (( y)). Small …rms are in the bottom 33% according to their book value of assets and capital stock, and large …rms are in the top 66%. Table 7 Managerial entrenchment and product market competition This table reports summary statistics of three groups of …rms based on the Her…ndahl Index (HI) of concentration for the industry that a …rm belongs to. The HI index is taken from the Census of Manufacturing. The least competitive group consists of the 33.33% …rms in the industries with the highest values of the HI index (high concentration), whereas the most competitive group is the top 33.33% …rms that belong to industries with the lowest HI industries (low concentration). q is the proxy for investment opportunities, 
